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Title IX: Sex Discrimination in Public
Elementary and Secondary Schools
by Jean M. Cary

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 grew
out of two of the most profound movements for social
change in this century- the civil rights movement and the
women's movement. Encouraged by the legislative and
judicial changes achieved during the civil rights movement, women began to focus their energies on the elimination of sex discrimination. FlUstrated with limited job
oppOltunities and discrepancies in salaries between men
and women, one place women hoped for legislative
change was in the educational arena.!
Congress responded to this political pressure by enacting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
Patterned after Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2
Title IX states, "No person in the United States shall on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."3 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act is
a more inclusive statute that prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in any
program receiving federal financial assistance. Title IX
prohibits only sex discrimination, and it applies only to
educational institutions that receive federal financial assistance. This mticle examines some aspects of Title IX
that are relevant to public elementm-y and secondary
schools.
The author will be a visiting professor at Campbell University School
of Law starting in August, 1991. She was a research associate at the Institute of Government from 1989 to 1990.
1. Carolyn Ellis Staton, "Sex Discrimination in Public Education,"
Mississippi Law f ournal 58 (Fall 1988): 323; and R. Salomone, Equal Education under Law, 113- 14 (New York: SI. Martin's Press, 1986).
2. 42 U.S.c. § 2000(d) (1982). Section 2000(d) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in federally ass isted programs.
3.20 U.S .C. § 1681 (1976).

Who Is Covered by Title IX
When Title IX was first enacted, a major question
was whether Title IX applied when an institution received
only indirect federal assistance. In 1977 Grove City College, a private coeducational institution, refused to sign an
assurance that it would comply with Title IX. Grove City
claimed that as a private institution it did not receive direct federal assistance and therefore was not obligated to
- abide by Title IX. The United States Department of Education claimed that Grove City College received indirect
federal assistance when it accepted Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) as tuition payments from
needy students. The Department of Education initiated
proceedings to declare the college and its students ineligible for BEOGs unless the college agreed to comply with
Title IX. Grove City and four of its students then sued the
Depmtment of Education. In the 1984 case Grove City
College v. Bell,4 the United States Supreme COUlt ruled
that Title IX applied to all fonns of federal aid to education, whether direct or indirect. Therefore Grove City had
to agree to comply with Title IX or lose any students who
wished to use BEOGs for tuition payments.
A second question that arose after the enactment of
Title IX was whether it applied to only the depmtment or
pmt of the institution that received federal funds , or if one
department's receipt of federal money obligated the entire institution to comply with Title IX. When this question arose in Grove City, the Supreme Court concluded
that Title IX applied to only the pmt of the institution that
received federal education funds and not to the institution
as a whole. Grove City College had argued that if the
4.465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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Comt found that the receipt of BEOGs did constitute federal assistance, only the financial aid office of the college
should be obligated to comply with Title IX. The United
States Supreme Court agreed. s
Grove City also had a major impact on three other
civil rights statutes that were worded in the same matmer
as Title IX.6 Congress reacted to the Supreme Court's decision by amending the four statutes 7 to make clear that
if any part of a system receives federal financial assistance, then the entire system must abide by the statute:
[The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987] will restore the broad, institution-wide application which characterized coverage and enforcement from the time of
initial passage until the Grove City decision . .. . The
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amends each of the
affected statutes by adding a section defining the plu'ase
"program or activity" and "program" to make clear that
discrimination is prohibited throughout entire agencies or
institutions if any part receives Federal financial assistance .... For education institutions, the bill provides that
where federal aid is extended anywhere within a college,
university , or public system of higher education, the entire institution is covered. If federal aid is extended anywhere in an elementary or secondary school system, the
entire system is covered. R
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How Title IX Is Enforced
There are two methods of enforcing Title IX: termination of federal funding or an individual private right of
action. The statute speaks only of the termination of federal funds. to The United States Supreme Court created the
second remedy when it allowed aggrieved individuals to
file their own lawsuits against institutions that are allegedly violating Title IX. II

Termination of Federal Funding

The Depattment of Education (and any other federal
department or agency that is empowered to extend federal financial assistance to any education progratn or activity) issues regulations or orders defining compliance
with Title IX. The department's Office of Civil Rights
(OCR) investigates complaints of violations of Title IX.
In addition OCR conducts compliance reviews to determine that recipients of federal education funds are complying with Title IX.' 2 If Title IX or its regulations are
violated, then the Department of Education must wam the
institution of the violation and give it an opportunity to
come into compliance. (Most cases are resolved through
voluntary compliance.) If the institution refuses to comBy amending the statute, Congress ovelTuled the part
ply, then the agency may terminate or refuse to grant fedof Grove City limiting the application of Title IX to the
eral financial assistance to the institution. The institution
department receiving federal assistance. It is now cleat·
is entitled to a hearing on the matter. Before tenninating
that Title IX requires an entire institution or education - federal funding, the head of the Department of Education
system to prohibit sex disClimination if any patt of the in(or other agency empowered to extend federal education
stitution or system receives federal assistance. 9 Because
funds) is required to file a report of the circumstances and
all school administrative units in NOlth Cat'olina receive
grounds for the proposed telmination with the United
some fonn of federal assistance, Title IX applies to all
States House of Representatives and Senate committees
North Cat'olina public elementat'y and secondary schools.
having legislative jurisdiction over the program. The
In fact, it applies to every public school in the country.
telmination of funding cannot occur until thirty days
after this report has been filed with the House and Senate
committees. 13
Federal regulations implementing Title IX provide
that a person who believes that he or she has been sub5.ld.
jected to discrimination prohibited by Title IX must file a
6. The three other statutes were Title VI of the Civil Ri ghts Act of
1964,42 U.S.c. § 2000(d) ( 1982); Secti on 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S .C. § 794 (1990); and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 , 296
U.S.c. § 621 ( 1985).
7. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102
Stat. 28 (1988) .
8. 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS, vol. 3, Legislative His·
tory of the Civil Righls Resloralion Acl of 1987, p. 6.
9. Title IX requires that every application for federal financial assistance for any education program or activity contain or be accompan ied by an
assurance from the applicant or recipient that each education program or activity operated by the applicant or rec ipient will be operated in compliance
with Title IX. Each recipient, or local educational agency [LEA as defined
by Section 80 I (I) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965] ,
is required to designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under Title IX. 34 C.P.R. §§ 106.8,
106.2 (1989).

10.20 U.S.C. § 1682 (197 6), as amended by Civil Ri ghts Restorati on
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) .
II. Cannon V. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
12. According to a press release from Michael Williams, assistant secretary of the Department of Education, entitled "National Enforcement Strategy, Office for Civil Rights" and issued in December, 1990, "The increased
complaint workload in FY 1990 a llowed OCR to devote only 3 percent of
its total staff resources to compliance review investigations, compared to 75
percent of the total staff resources used for complaint investigations and related activities; e.g., monitoring, complainant appeals and quality review. We
intend to devote the bulk of any new resources to the compliance rev iew
program. Reviews of larger institutions will be carried out by teams to expedite the gathering and analysi s of data and the development of the letters
of findings ."
13. 20 U.S .C. § 1682.
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written complaint with the Department of Education no
later than 180 days from the date of the alleged
discrimination. The Depmtment of Education also has the
authority to extend the time for filing the complaint. 14
Once the administrative complaint is filed, OCR must
then investigate the alleged discrimination.

Litigation
The other method of enforcement of Title IX is the
private cause of action. Although the Title IX statute does
not mention a private cause of action, the United States
Supreme COUlt has found that private litigants who allege
that their Title IX rights have been violated may seek redress through their own lawsuits. IS In approving enforcement through a private cause of action, the COUlt relied
on the similm'ity between Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and Title IX. Courts had em'lier approved a private
cause of action under Title VI. 16 The Supreme Court also
hem'd testimony from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfm'e (the agency that was then in chm'ge of
the enforcement of Title IX) that it did not have the resources to enforce Title IX in a substantial number of circumstances mld it therefore supported a private cause of
action. The Comt held, "We have no doubt that Congress
intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those
available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as
authorizing an implied plivate cause of action for victims
of the prohibited discrimination."'?
Persons pursuing a private cause of action are not
required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
a lawsuit. In other words, such persons are not required
to ask the Department of Education or any other administrative body to intervene to protect their rights under
Title IX before resorting to court action. They may go
straight to court. IS
If a student sues a state agency for a violation of Title
IX, the state cannot defend the lawsuit by claiming that

14. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (1989).
15. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
16. lei. at 696 [citing Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d
847,852 (5th CiL), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967)].
17. Cannon v. Univers ity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979). In
this case a woman who was denied admission to two medical schools brought
a civil rights suit chmging the two schools with sex discrimination under Title
IX. The school s had denied her admission even though they had admitted
applicants who were less qualified. The schools had a policy of excluding
anyone over the age of thirty. The petitioner, who was thirty-nine years of
age, claimed that the policy of excluding applicants over the age of thirty had
a discriminatory impact on women because women were more likely to postpone their higher education in order to raise a famil y. The Court's decision
permitted her to pursue her lawsuit against the two schools.
18. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 (1979),
n.4l: "For these reasons, we are not persuaded that indi vidual suits m'e inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Because the
individual complainants cannot assure themselves that the admini strative
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as a governmental agency it is immune from liability. In
1986 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment,' 9 which provides that a state shall not
be inlmUlle under the Eleventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution from suit in federal court for a violation of Title IX. Therefore if a state is sued for a violation of Title IX, it will be liable to the same extent as any
other public or private entity.
Statute of limitations. As mentioned earlier, federal
regulations implementing Title IX provide a 180-day time
limit for filing administrative complaints. However, these
regulations do not contain a statute of limitations for the
filing of litigation. 20 Because litigants do not have to exhaust administrative remedies prior to going to comt, they
may miss the 180-day time limit for filing an administrative complaint and still pursue litigation under Title IX.
Because there is no statute of limitations provided in
Title IX, and the United States Supreme Court has not
defined the appropriate time limit in Title IX cases, courts
are likely to analogize Title IX to civil rights actions and
look to the recent United States Supreme COUlt decision
of Owens v. Okure 21 to determine the appropriate statute
of limitations. In Owens the Court found that the appropriate statute of limitations in civil rights actions under
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is a
state's residual or general personal injury statute of limitations. In Owens the plaintiff claimed that he had been
- beaten by police officers when he was arrested. Twentytwo months after the incident the plaintiff sued, claiming
a violation of his civil rights. The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint clainUng that the deadline for filing
the action had passed. Defendants argued that the COUlt
should utilize the state's strict one-yem' statute of limitations for intentional t01tS instead of the broader three-yem'
general statute of limitations. The Supreme Court ruled
that when state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering Section 1983 claims should use the general or residual statute
for personal injury actions.22 Therefore the Court ruled
that the case was timely filed under the state's three-year
statute of limitations.
Although no courts have yet applied Owens v. Okure
to Title IX, because Title IX violations are similar to civil

process will reach a decision on their complaints within a reasonable time,
it makes little sense to require exhaustion." See also Simpson v. Reynolds
Metal Co., Inc., 629 F.2d. 1226 (7th CiL 1980); and Rothschild v.
Grottenthaler, 716 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
19. Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment [codified at 42
U.S.c. § 2000d-7 (1988)].
20. Minor v. Northville Pub. Schools, 605 F. Supp. 1185, 1199-200
(E.D. Mich . 1985).
2 1. 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
22. lei. at 249-50.

)
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rights injuries, courts may use the reasoning of that case
the teacher had also authorized her late admittance to
to find that a state' s general or residual statute of limitaother classes on several occasions. The student presented
extensive evidence in court showing that other school
tions is appropriate. 23 The residual statute in North Carolina is three years.24
officials knew of the relationship and did not take approCompensatory damages. When the Supreme Court
priate action to protect the girl. The eleventh circuit decided that the Supreme Court decision in Guardians
decided that litigants have the right to pursue a private
Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York28
cause of action against an institution for alleged genderbased discrimination, the COUlt did not decide if a person
precluded a cause of action for damages for unintentional
may be compensated monetarily when she or he is sucdiscrimination but left open the question of drunages for
intentional discrimination under Title IX. Basing its decessful in such a lawsuit. 25 Because the issue of compensation did not arise in the case, the Court authorized only
cision on eru'lier precedent in the circuit, the eleventh cirdeclarative and injunctive relief. In other words, a litigant
cuit ruled that a student could not recover compensatory
could seek a comt order requiring an educational institudamages under Title IX even if the student proved intention to comply with Title IX. A litigant also could seek
tional discrimination. 29
an order declruiug or defining an institution's action as a
In another recent case the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that if the litigant proved discriminatory
violation of Title IX. More recently litigants have sought
monetary compensation as well as declarative and injtillCintent she could recover compensatory damages under
Title IX.30 The plaintiff was a member of her high school
tive relief.
Cunently there is a conflict in the circuit courts on
chapter of the National Honor Society (NHS). She was
the availability of monetary awards in Title IX cases.
dismissed from the NHS when she became pregnant out
When the monetru'y compensation issue arose in the Sevof wedlock. She alleged that the principal and the teachers who composed the faculty council governing the NHS
enth Circuit COUlt of Appeals, the COUlt found that both
Title IX and its legislative history were silent as to the
chapter had discriminated against her on the basis of sex.
existence of a financial award for sexual discrimination.
The third circuit remanded the case to the district court
with instructions that the court hear the plaintiff's eviBecause the comt found that by accepting federal money,
dence that two years after her dismissal a male member
an institution could potentially be exposing itself to huge
of the NHS had not been dismissed after he impregnated
financial liability-possibly greater than the federal funds
received-the court concluded that institutions should - his girlfriend. He later mruTied his girlfriend just prior to
the bnth of then' child. The faculty council did not take
not be forced to pay damages unless the statute clearly
informs them of their potential liability. Because Conany action against him. The third circuit instructed the
district COUlt to hear the male student's testnnony and then
gress did not create an explicit monetary compensation
remedy, the comt found that the plaintiff was not entitled
detelmine if the plan1tiff had been discriminated against
intentionally on the basis of her sex. The third circuit
to damages. 26
found that compensatory damages could be awarded unIn a more recent case, Franklin v. Gwinnett County
der Title IX if the plaintiff proved discriminatory intent.
Public Schools, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
The question of whether a litigant can receive comconcluded that because the Supreme Court has not decided whether a litigant can recover compensatory dampensatory damages under Title IX if she or he proves that
the educational institution intentionally discriminated
ages for intentional discrimination under Title IX, each
against the litigant has not been decided by the Fomth
circuit court of appeals can decide the issue for itselfY
Cn'cuit Court of Appeals, which includes North Carolina,
In the eleventh circuit case, a female student sued seeking damages for alleged intentional gender-based discrimination against her. She alleged that she and her
28. 463 U.S. 584 (1983). In that opinion the United States Supreme
economics teacher had engaged in two or three episodes
Court agreed that di scriminatory intent was not a prerequisite to relie.f under
of sexual intercourse on school property . .She stated that
Title VI, but "at [east five justi ces would not allow compensatory relief to a
23. See Minor v. Northville Pub. Schools. 605 F. Supp. [185 (E.D.
Mich . [985), for a decision applying this concept to Tit[e IX before Owens
v. Okure.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § [,52(5) (1983).
25. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
26. Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 11 85 (7th Cir.
1981).
27.911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. [990) , petitionjor cert.filed, 59 U.S .L.W.
3441 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1990) (No. 90,918).

private plaintiff under Title VI absent proof of discriminatory intent."
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617, 620 (I I th Cir.
1990), [citing Manecke v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, Fla. , 762 F.2d 912,
922 n.8 (lith Cir. 1985), cat. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986)). The eleventh
circuit looked to the Supreme Court decision in Guardians because Title IX
was modeled after Title VI.
29. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools , 911 F.2d 617, 622
( II th Cir. 1990) [citing Drayden v. Needville Indep. School Dist., 642 F.2d
129 (5th Cir. Unit A, 1981)].
30. Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School Dist. , 917 F.2d 779 (3d CiT.
1990).
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or the United States Supreme Comt. Plaintiffs in Franklin
v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the eleventh circuit
case described above, have filed a petition for certiorari,
asking the United States Supreme Court to heal' the case.
The Comt has asked the solicitor general to file a brief in
the case expressing the views of the United States. 31 Because of the conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court
may agree to hear the case. Unless there is a decision by
either the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals or the United
States Supreme Court finding that damages al'e unavailable, North Carolina school authorities should be aware
that litigants might be able to obtain compensatory damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief under
Title IX, if they prove that school officials have discriminated intentionally against them.
Attorney's fees. In a significant amendment to Section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code, Congress clarified that federal courts have the discretion to
award attorney' s fees to successful litigants under Title
IX. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 authOlizes federal courts to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party in a Title IX case. The amount of
attorney's fees can be a substantial cost to an unsuccessful
litigant. 32

When Title IX Applies
Admission and Scholarship Policies
Title IX prohibits educational institutions that receive federal funding from discriminating on the basis
of sex in the admission of candidates to their programs.
This prohibition applies to admission policies in institutions of vocational education, professional education,
graduate higher education, and undergraduate higher
education.33
Admission issues rarely arise in public elementary
and secondalY schools. Occasionally vocational education
programs involve admission decisions. Under Title IX, if
an institution receives any federal financial assistance, its
vocational education programs cannot treat applicants for
admission differently on the basis of actual or potential
parental, family, or mal'ital status, or pregnancy, childbuth, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom. 34
For example, if a pregnant student applies for admission
31. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, _
U.S. _
, III
S. Ct. 949 (1990).
32. Attorney's fees awards have reached six figures in some cases.
Ellen J. Vargyas , attomey , National Women 's Law Center, conversation with
author, 26 February 1991.
33 . 20 U.S.c. § 1681(a)(I).
34. 34 C.P.R. § 106.21(c)(I) and (2) (1989).
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to a vocational course in welding, school officials cannot
prevent her entry in the program because of her sex or her
pregnancy. They can require her to obtain a medical certification that she is physically able to participate in the
course, so long as such a certification is requu'ed of all students who have other physical conditions requu'ing the
attention of a physician. 35
In a similar area in the public schools, a New York
court intervened in the use of test scores to award scholarships when high school students alleged sex
discrimination in the decision-making process. In 1989
applicants for the New York State Regents and Empire
scholarships successfully sued the New York Education
Department concerning the method of determining the
winners of these scholarships?6 The female students
claimed that the depmtment discriminated against them
under Title IX when it allowed the SAT score to be used
as the sole determination of qualification for the scholarships. It was undisputed that the female high school seniors scored an average of sixty points lower on the SAT
tests than their male counterpmts, even though they performed as well or better in high school courses. Defendants' reliance on the SAT as the sole criterion resulted in
a consistent pattern: females received only 43 percent and
28 percent of the Regents and Empire State scholarships,
respectively, although they represented 53 percent of the
applicant pool.
In the year before the lawsuit, the New York legislature had ordered the department to find a better indication of high school achievement than the SAT scores. In
response the depmtment had weighted the SAT scores and
the grade point averages of the students equally. This formula had improved the balance of females in relation to
males: females who had comprised 53.3 percent of the
applicant pool had received 49.3 percent and 37.4 percent
of the Regents and Empire State scholarships, respectively, that year. At the time of the lawsuit, the depaltment
had decided to revert to its earlier method of exclusive reliance on the SAT scores. 37
The federal court granted a preliminary injunction
after it concluded that the depmtment's sole reliance on
SAT scores denied the plaintiffs equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment and violated Title IX. The
COUlt prohibited the department from relying exclusively
on the SAT scores in the awm'd of Regents and Empu'e
State scholarships.

35. 34 C.P.R. § I 06.40(b) (1989).
36. Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. Dept. , 709 F. Supp.
345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
37. Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. Dept., 127 P.R.D.
84, 86- 87 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1989).
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of students of one sex. If they find such a situation, they
are required under Title IX to determine if the predominance of one sex in the course is the result of
discrin1ination on the basis of sex in the counseling of students or the career interest materials used by counselors,
and if so, to take corrective action.41 For instance, if a
school official discovers that only males are taking shop,
while only females are taking home economics, the official should talk with the school counselors and teachers
to see if they are encouraging students of one sex to pursue a particular course plan, while discouraging students
of the otl1er sex in a similar pursuit. If the official finds
that the counselors or teachers are in fact responsible for
the dispropOltionate balance in the sexual enrollment in
these courses, he or she is required to take corrective
action.

Schools covered by Title IX cannot exclude any student from any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or other education program or activity
on the basis of sex. 38 For example, schools cannot offer
separate classes for boys and girls in health, physical
education, business, industrial arts, home economics, or
music. 39
Title IX regulations provide for two exceptions to the
rule prohibiting separate classes. Schools may separate
students in elementary and secondary schools by sex
when the class deals exclusively with human sexuality.
Music teachers may also make requirements based on
vocal range or quality that may result in a chorus of one
Competitive Athletics
or predominantly one sex.
Title IX has had a dramatic impact on the paJticipaAlthough physical education classes cannot be sepation of girls in high school athletics. In 1971 only 7.4 perrated by sex, students may be divided into different
classes or grouped into separate groups within a class if
cent of high school interscholastic athletes were girls. Title
IX went into effect in 1972, and the following year the
they are assessed by objective standards of individual
ability and perfonuance developed and applied without
paJticipation rate of female athletes rose by more than half
regard to sex. However, physical education teachers cana million nationwide. By the 1989-90 school year, the
not use a single standard of measuring skill or progress
paJticipation rate of girls in high school athletics had risen
to 35 percent. 42 In 1971 North Carolina offered high
that has an adverse effect on members of one sex. Instead,
they must use appropriate standards that do not have such
school state championships to girls in only two sports,
an effect. Finally, Title IX penuits the division of physi- - golf and tem1is, while today girls compete for state honors in ten sports.43 Despite this marked improvement,
cal education classes by sex when the activity involves
many girls still do not have the athletic opportunities that
bodily contact, such as wrestling, boxing, rugby, ice
hockey, football, and basketball. 40
boys have. Some girls have pursued litigation to remedy
the situation.
Counseling
Three different strains of litigation have developed
as courts have attempted to resolve issues of sex disUnder Title IX school officials cam10t discriminate
against any person on the basis of sex in the provision of
crimination in athletics. Some litigants have sought relief
under Title IX.44 Other litigants have focused on state
counseling or guidance services. Guidance counselors
equal lights statutes or constitutional amendments as the
may not use different materials for male and female stubasis of their causes of action. 45 A third group of litigants
dents unless the materials cover the same occupations and
has claimed that educational institutions have denied them
the use of the different materials is shown to be essential
to limit sex bias. School officials should be alelt to ways
in which counselors may unintentionally encourage a student to pursue a sex-stereotyped career or course plan,
41. 34 C.F.R. § 106.36(a) through (c) (1989).
42. Statistics compiled by the National Federation of State Hi gh
when other choices would be more appropriate for the stuSchool Associations, 1990 Handbook (Kansas City, Mo.: NFSHSA, 1990),
dent. For example, male students should not be the only
73.
ones who receive infonuation on military careers while
43. Thomas H. Thornburg, "The Validity of Single Sex and Coed, Interscholastic Sports Teams," School Law Bulletin 21 (Spring 1990): II , hereonly females receive infonuation on careers in nursing.
inafter cited as Thornburg, "Sports Teams"); N.C. High School Athletic
In addition school officials should be on the lookout
Association, 1988-89 Handbook (Chapel Hill, N.C.: NCHSAA, 1988), 12.
for courses in which there is a dispropOltionate em-ollment
44. Croteau v. Fair, 686 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1988); Rowley by
38.34 C.F.R. § 106.31 ( 1989).
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (1989).
40. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b) tlu'Ough (f) (1989).

Rowley v. Board of Educ. of St. Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-lJ, 863 F.2d
39 (10th Cir. 1988).
45. B .C. v. Board of Educ., 220 N.J. Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059
(1987); Commonwealth ex rei. Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Ass'n,
18 Pa. Coml11w. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
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their state or federal constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws in the administration of athletic programs. 46 Because some litigants have sought relief under
more than one cause of action, the following discussion
is divided into topics according to the description of the
litigant and not the cause of action used by the litigant.
The Title IX litigation relies on Title IX's prohibition on recipients of federal assistance from discriminating on the basis of sex in any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics offered by an
educational institution. According to the Title IX regulations, no recipient of federal assistance may provide athletics separately according to the sex of the paIticipants,
or exclude members of one sex from paIticipating in athletics. 47 There are two huge exceptions to Title IX's prohibition on separate teams for males aIld females: if the
selection for the separate teams is based upon competitive
skill or if the activity is a contact sport.
Selection based on competitive skill. Title IX provides that an educational institution may operate or sponsor a teru.n in a particulaI' sport for members of one sex if
the selection is based on competitive skill. Because almost
all athletic teams aI'e chosen based on competitive skill,
this exception to the lUle prohibiting separation of teams
by sex covers a large portion of athletics. However, the
regulations provide that if there is not a team available for
members of the opposite sex, and athletic oppOltunities for
members of that sex have been limited previously, thew
members of the excluded sex must be allowed to tryout
for the team unless the sport involved is a contact sport. 48
For instance, if the school has a golf teaIn for men but no
golf team for women, then women must be pelmitted the
opportunity to tryout for the men 's golf team.
Comparable teamfor female athletes does not exist.
Since the enactment of Title IX, federal and state comts
have been viltually unanimous in upholding the regulation allowing women to tryout for men ' s noncontact
sports teams when there are no comparable teams for
women. 49 Neither Title IX nor the courts that have
46. Croteau v. Fair, 686 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1988); Rowley v.
Board of Educ. of S!. Vrain Valley Schoo l Dis!. RE-lJ, 863 F.2d 39 ( 10th
Cir. 1988); B.C. v. Board of Educ., 220 N.J. Super. 2 14, 531 A.2d 1059
(1 987); Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass' n, 695 F. 2d 11 26 (9th Cir.
1982); Ritacco v. Norwin School Dis!., 36 1 F. Supp. 930 (W.O. Pa. 1973).
47. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 I(a) (1989).
48.34 C. F.R. § 106.41 (b) (1989). See the section in this article on
contact sports.
49. Thornburg, "Sports Teams." See also Bednar v. Nebraska School
Activities Ass' n, 531 F.2d 922 (8 th CiI. 1976) (cross-country runni ng);
Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (crosscountry rUlming ,md sk iing); Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d
1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (tennis); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp.,
259 Ind. 515 , 289 N.E.2d 494 (1972) (go lf); Hoover v. Meiklejohn , 430 F.
Supp. 164 C
D.Colo. 1977) (soccer).
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considered the issue have mandated that women be permitted to play on these teams. Instead, their right is limited to the 0PPOItunity to tryout. If they make the team,
of course, they then have the right to be on the team.
In 1988 a Virginia federal distlict court ruled that
Julie Croteau, a seventeen-year-old high school senior,
had not been discriminated against when she was "cut"
after the second tryout for the men's baseball team. The
court concluded that she had failed to prove that the decision to cut her from the vaI'sity baseball teru.n was motivated by gender bias. Rather, the court concluded that
she had received a fair tryout and the coach's decision to
cut her was made in good faith. The comt explained its
decision:
[T]he law 's mandate of equality does not dictate a disregard of the differences in talents and abilities among
individuals. As the Court noted from the bench, there is
no constitutional or statutory right to play any position
on any athletic team. Instead, there is only the right to
compete fo r such a position on equal tenns and to be free
from sex di scrimination in state action.50

Sometimes OCR has gone fmther than requiring an
educational institution to permit a female student to try out
for the male team. The HEW Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Interpretation issued in 1979 fmther requires that
in celtain situations involving noncontact sports an educational institution must sponsor a team for members of
the excluded sex. For instance, if the school has a golf
teru.n for males but no golf team for females, a school will
be required to sponsor a golf teru.n for females if the following circumstances exist:
1. The opportunities for members of the excluded sex
have historically been limited;
2. There is sufficient interest and ability among the
members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team
and a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition fo r that team; and
3. Members of the excluded sex do not possess sufficient
skill to be selected for a single integrated team, or to
compete actively on such a team if selected. 51

Although this Policy Interpretation was designed specifically for intercollegiate athletics, "its general principles
will often apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic
athletic programs, which aI'e also covered by regulation."52
Comparable team for male athletes does not exist.
When male students have sued seeking the right to tryout
and play for a women 's team, most courts have ruled that
male students do not have a right to paIticipate on the
50. Croteau v. Fair, 686 F. Supp. 552, 554 (E.D. Va. 1988).
51. Interco llegiate Athletics Policy Interpretation, iss ued December
11,1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 7141 3, 7141 8.
52. ld. at 71413.
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women's team.53 Although this result appears contradictory to that achieved by women when they have sued,
courts have justified excluding men from women's teams
for two major reasons: First, courts have 1U1ed that historically women have been excluded from participation in
SPOltS, while men have had and continue to have ample
opportunity to participate in athletic activities. COUltS have
reasoned that if men are permitted to join women's teams,
they will be taking the positions from women, thereby further reducing the opportunity of women to participate in
sports. Second, men are often taller and stronger and
therefore, if allowed to pmticipate, may soon dominate the
women's teams.
Courts that have applied Title IX to situations in
which a male wishes to play on a female athletic team
have arrived at differing interpretations of the Depmtment
of Education's regulation requiring a school to determine
if the "athletic opportunities for members of that sex have
previously been limited."54 Most COUtts have looked to the
overall athletic opportunities for members of the excluded
sex at that pmticular schooJ.55 For instance, a New York
COUlt determined that if the overall athletic opportunities
for males were equal to or better than those of females at
the school in question, then males could be excluded from
a particular team without violating Title IX.56
Comparable team for female athletes does exist. Occasionally outstanding female athletes have sued to join
male teams so that they cm1 have a higher level of com-petition. COutts have generally rejected these claims when
there is already a female team in existence. 57
Under Title IX regulations schools must petmit females to try out for male teams only when there m'e no
female temns, and then only when it is a noncontact SpOlt
and there has been a past history of discrimination in
athletic opportunities for women. 58 Even though they do
not have a claim under Title IX, students may still sue
under other legal theories. For instance, they may allege

53. Thomburg, "Sports Teams." See also Rowley v. Bomd of Educ.
of St. Vrain Valley, 863 F.2d 39 (10th CiJ. 1989); B.C. v. Board of Educ.,
220 N.J. Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059 ( 1987); Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982), cuI. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983);
Petrie v. Illinois High School Athletic Ass' n, 75 III. App. 3d 980, 394 N.E.2d
855 (1979); and Muladaradelis v. Haldane Central School Bd., 74 A.D.2d
248,427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980).
54.34 C.F.R. § 106.4I(b) (1989).
55. Thornburg, "Sports Teams." See also Forte 'y. North Babylon
Union Free School Dist., 105 Misc. 2d 36, 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Special Term, 1980); and Muladaradelis v. Haldane Central School Bd., 74
A.D.2d 248, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980).
56. Muladaradelis v. Haldane Central School Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 427
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980).
57. Thornburg, "Sports Teams."
58.34 c.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1989).
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violations of equal protection or a violation of a state's
equal rights act.
Contact sports. The Department of Education regulations issued under Title IX exempt schools from providing coeducational tean1S for contact sports. The regulations
define contact sports as including "boxing, wrestling,
rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other SPOltS the
purpose of major activity of which involves bodily contact."59 The HEW Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Interpretation provides that if a higher educational institution
sponsors a temn for members of one sex in a contact sport,
it must do so for members of the other sex under the following circumstances:
1. The oppOltunities for members of the excluded
sex have historically been limited.
2. There is sufficient interest and ability among
the members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable temn and a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for that team.6()
Comparable team for female athletes does not exist.
Despite these regulations and policies, since the mid1970s women have consistently won the right to compete
on men ' s teams in contact sports when there are no
women's teams available to them. Instead of limiting their
legal theories to Title IX, they have alleged a violation of
a state equal rights act or a violation of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection under the law. Women have
succeeded in winning the right to compete on men's contact sports teams when there were no women's teams in
wrestling, football, and soccer and in Massachusetts, in all
contact sportS. 61
For example, a federal dishict court in Nebraska invalidated a mle that prohibited females from joining a
male wrestling team when there were no female teams. 62
The COUlt condemned a mle that pennitted males regardless of body size, sh'ength level, speed capability, or
muscle power output to tryout for the temn, but prohibited all females. The court rejected "[s]uch a paternalistic
gender-based classification" that results from ascribing a
particulm' trait or quality to one sex, when not all share

59.ld.
60. Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Interpretation, issued December
11,1979,44 Fed. Reg. 71418.
61. Thornburg, "Sports Teams," at 13; Saint v. Nebraska School Activities Ass ' n, 684 F . Supp. 626 (D. Neb. 1988) (wrestling); Lantz v.
Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (football); Force v. Pierce City
R-VI School Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.Mo. 1983) (football); Hoover
v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) (soccer); Balsley v. North
Hunterdon Regional High School Bd. of Educ. , 225 N.J. 221, 542 A.2d 29
(1988) (football); Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives,
347 Mass. 836,371 N.E.2d 426 (1977) (all sports).
62. Saint v. Nebraska School Activities Ass ' n, 684 F. Sllpp. 626 (D.
Neb. 1988).
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that trait or quality. The court concluded that such a result is not only inherently unfair, but generally tends only
to perpetuate stereotypical notions regarding the proper
roles of men and women and results in a denial of equal
protection of the laws for all women to whom the rule
applies. 63
Comparable team for f emale athletes does exist. A
federal circuit court of appeals and one Justice of the
United States Supreme Court reached a different result
when the female requesting the right to play on a male
contact sport team already had the opportunity to play on
a female team. 64 In 1981 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected an Illinois girl 's petition to overturn a
rule that prevented her from playing on her junior-high
boys ' basketball team. When Karen O 'Comlor emolled in
the sixth grade, she was told that she could only play on
the girls' basketball team. When the district court first
heard the case, it concluded that the boys ' and girls' teams
were not equal, because the girls' team did not give her
the opportunity to compete with those who were equal or
superior to her in skil1. 65 The school officials appealed.
The school officials won before the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. Karen O 'Connor then sought a temporary delay of the tryouts until her case could be argued
before the United States Supreme Court. Justice Stevens,
sitting as a single judge, ruled against Karen on her motion for a delay of the tryouts. He found the rule prohibiting girls from competing against boys in contact sports
to be rational.
Without a gender-based class ification in competitive
contact sports, there would be a substantial risk that boys
wou ld dominate the girls' programs and deny them an
equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic events.
The defendants' program appears to have been adopted
in full compliance with the regulations promulgated by
the Department of Health, Ed ucation, and Welfare. Although such compliance certainl y does not cOIner immunity on the defendants, it does indicate a strong
probability that the gender-based classi fication can be
adequately justifiedY'

Because the case was never argued before the full
United States Supreme Court, it is unclear how the Court
would rule when confronted with a case in which a female
sought to playa contact sport on a male team when a female team already existed.
63. Id. at 629.
64. O'Connor v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. 23, 645 F.2d 578 (7th
Cir. 198 1), on application to vacate stay, 449 U.S. 130 1 (S tevens, Circuit
Justice, 1980), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 ( 1982), on remand, 545 F. Supp.
376 (N.D. III. 1982).
65. O' Connor v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. 23, 545 F. Supp. 376
(N.D. 1II. 1982).
66. O'Connor v. Bmu-d of Ecl uc. of School Dist. 23, on application
to vacate stay, 449 U. S. 1301 , 1307 (Stevens, Circuit Justice, 1980).
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Equal athletic opportunity. When it published
regulations to govern the administration of Title IX, the
Depattment of Education mandated that all recipients of
federal education assistance provide "equal athletic opportunity" for members of both sexes if the recipient operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or
intramural athletics. Although the regulations do not define "equal athletic opportunity," they do provide a list of
factors the director of the Office of Civil Rights may consider when detennining if an institution is complying with
the equal OPPOltunity mandate:
1. Whether the selection of sports and levels of
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes
2. The provision of equipment and supplies
3. Scheduling of games and practice time
4. Travel and per diem allowance
5. Opportunity to receive coaching and academic
tutoring
6. Assignment and compensation of coaches and
tutors
7. Provision of locker rooms and practice and
competitive facilities
8. Provision of medical and training facilities and
services
9. Provision of housing and dining facilities and
serVIces
10. Publicity67
According to the regulations, the above list is not
exhaustive. In addition the regulations provide that unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or
for male and female teams do not constitute a violation
of the regulations automatically, but the director of the Offi ce of Civil Rights may consider the failure to provide
necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex. Under the
1979 HEW Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidelines,
the Depattment of Education will assess compliance with
both the recruitment and the general athletic program requirements of the regulation by comparing the availability, quality, and kinds of benefits, opportunities, and
treatment afforded members of both sexes. "Institutions
will be in compliance if the compared program components are equivalent, that is, equal or equal in effect. Under this standard, identical benefits, opportunities, or
treatment at'e not required, provided the overall effect of
any differences is negligible."68
In a lengthy opinion a federal dish'ict court in Pennsylvania analyzed the athletic program at Temple University
67 . 34 C.P.R. § 106.4 1(c) (1989).
68. Intercollegiate Athl etics Po licy Interpretation , issued December
11 , 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 71413 , 71415.
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in light of the opportunities available to men and women
students. 69 Women students had sued claiming that although the school offered both male and female teams, the
women were discriminated against because the programs
and the money expended on the women's athletic teams
were not equal to that expended for the male teams. The
students alleged that the separate programs were unequal
in almost every conceivable area including opportunities
to compete, expenditures, recruiting, coaching, travel and
per diem allowances, uniforms, equipment, supplies, training facilities, academic tutoring, and publicity. The students claimed that they were being discriminated against
under Title IX in the unequal financial aid provided to
male and female athletes, and that they were discriminated
against under the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution because of the unequal expenditures
for the male and female teams.
After a hearing on motions for summary judgment
(asking the court to issue a ruling without a trial), the comt
concluded that although Temple University was not obligated to sponsor an intercollegiate athletic program, if it
chose to do so, then the program "must be made available
to all on equal telms. "70 The court found that the women
had raised legitimate claims that they could present at hial
concerning the number of teams available for men versus
the number of teams available for women, and the expenditure of approximately $2,100 more per male student athlete than per female student athlete.
The North Carolina appellate courts have not decided any cases that interpret these regulations. In addition the Fourth Circuit Comt of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court have not decided any cases defining the meaning of "equal athletic opportunity" in the Depmtment of Education 's regulations concerning Title IX.

Sexual Harassment and
Title IX
Public elementary and secondary school officials
should be awm'e that in recent yem's courts have begun to
recognize sexual harassment as a valid legal claim. As
early as 1977 a federal district court found that sexual harassment was a valid legal claim under Title IX.71In 1986
The United States Supreme Court first addressed sexual
hm'assment in the workplace in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.72 In that case a bank teller sued her employer
charging that she had been subjected to a sexually hostile

69. Hafer v. Temple University , 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.Pa. 1987).
70. Id. at 525.
7 1. Alexander v. Yale, 459 F. Supp. I (D. COlli. 1977), affd, 63 1 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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work environment because of the unwelcome advances of
a vice-president and bank manager. She testified that
she had been fondled in front of other employees and that
she had been forcibly raped. Because of her fear of losing her job, she said she had succumbed to her boss's unwelcome advances, The United States Supreme Court
upheld the Health and Human Services regulation that
'" [u ]nwelcome sexual advances ... and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . [constitute] sexual
harassment ... [when] such conduct has the purpose or
effect of umeasonably interfering with an individual's
work peIiOlmance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive working environment. ' "73
Although the United States Supreme Court has not
yet decided a case of sexual harassment under Title IX,
lower courts have found that sexual harassment is a violation of Title IX. In Alexander v. Yale 74 a lower comt tn-st
recognized sexual harassment as a valid claim under Title
IX. In that case women students joined former students
and faculty members in seeking a court order requiring
Yale University to implement a mechanism for processing sexual harassment complaints.
In a more recent case the First Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Supreme COUlt' S reasoning in Meritor
and concluded, "in a Title IX case, an educational institution is liable upon a finding of hostile environment
sexual hm'assment perpetrated by its supervisors upon employees if an official representing that institution knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of
the hm'assment' s occurrence, unless that official can show
that he or she took appropriate steps to halt it."75
According to the National Coalition for Women and
Girls in Education, there m'e two basic types of sexual harassment. Both types violate Title IX.
The first type is characterized by the imposition of un,
welcome sex ual activity in a relationship of uneq ual
power. Examples of this type of harassment include unwelcome sex ual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when
(1) submission to or rejection of such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of instruction, employment, or participation in an educational
activity or (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as a bas is for evaluation in making academic or personnel decisions affecting an individual. The second type of harass ment occurs where
harassment creates a hostile, intimidating, or offensive

73 . Id. at 65 [citing 29 C.F. R. § 1604. II (a)(3) (1988)] .
74. 459 F. Supp. I (D. Conn. 1977), off d, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1980). See also Elaine D. Ingulli, "Sexual Hm'assment in Education," Rutgers
Law Journal 18 (1987): 28 1; and Carolyn Elli s Staton, "Sex Discrimination
in Public Ed ucation ," Mississippi Law Journal 58 ( 1988): 323.
75. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 88 1, 901 (1st Cir.
1988).
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academic or work environment and those in a position
of authority do not redress the problem. 76

The Office of Civil Rights found a violation of Title
IX when a high school coach and economics teacher became involved in a sexual relationship with one of his female students. The school's principal was informed of the
relationship and discouraged the student from pursuing
the matter. At the end of the school year the principal
retired and the coach resigned. The Office of Civil Rights
investigated the case and found a Title IX violation. It
closed its investigation after it received assurances that
76. National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education, Title IX:
A Practical Guide 10 Achieving Sex Equity in Education (Washington , D.C. :
NCWGE, 1988), II.
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actions had been taken to prevent any future violations of
Title IX.77

Conclusion
It is clear that Title IX can affect many areas of public elementary and secondary schools: athletics, physical education and other special classes, counseling,
admissions, and others. Because Title IX applies to all
North Carolina public schools, officials must be careful
to avoid sex discrimination in any school programs or
policies . •
77. Franklin v. G winnett County Pub. School s, 911 F.2ci 617 (11 th
Cir. 1990).

